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2. Sovereignty, conservation and sustainable use 
Christine Willmore 
Professor of Sustainability and Law at Bristol University, UK. 
Abstract 
The Convention on Biological Diversity approach to conservation and sustainable use 
is rooted in sovereignty. This chapter explores the limitations of such an approach and 
the opportunities it provides for contextualised approaches. It explores the role of 
regional agreements and the gradual movement from approaches based upon 
acceptance of sovereignty to challenges to national sovereignty over natural resources. 
It considers the extent to which the current international rules on conservation and on 
sustainable use are constraining national sovereignty or providing a protected space 
for national action. 
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2.1 Sovereignty and its tensions 
The approach to conservation and sustainable use in the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD) is rooted in sovereignty. This chapter explores the limitations of such 
an approach and the opportunities it provides for contextualised approaches. It 
explores the gradual movement from approaches based upon acceptance of 
sovereignty to challenges to national sovereignty over natural resources. It considers 
the extent to which current international rules on conservation and on sustainable use 
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constrain national sovereignty or provide protected space for national action. The 
chapter looks at CBD governance, but it must be recognised that much global 
governance lies outside of such an analysis, and that the powers and influences 
excluded from this discussion can be more significant than those included.  
International legal instruments addressing conservation and sustainable use are firmly 
rooted in the Westphalian model of sovereign states as geopolitical entities entering 
mutual agreements. The CBD is exception, with a focus upon seeking to achieve 
responsible exercise of state sovereignty rather than overriding it. Its success depends 
upon the internal action of states and international support to facilitate that. This 
emphasis upon sovereignty in relation to the management of the ecosphere has a long 
history,1 and whilst sovereignty does not connote ownership, it authorises control over 
resources lying within the jurisdiction of the State. In 1962, a UN General Assembly 
Resolution2 asserted ‘The right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over 
their natural wealth and resources’ including their disposal in accordance with their 
national interest. This only has declaratory force, but is often seen as stating existing 
law,3 and has been repeated in subsequent declarations.4  
 Whilst some global concerns have permeated sovereignty so as to undermine its 
absolutist elements, in relation to biodiversity the choice has been to harness 
sovereignty in the pursuit of biodiversity protection rather than to subvert it – but 
stressing cooperation in how sovereign powers are exercised. Some writers argue that 
the emphasis upon cooperation goes so far as to redefine sovereignty,5 but the light 
touch associated with cooperation in the CBD is consistent with a traditional 
sovereignty approach linked to self-interest derived (or financial incentive-based6) 
collaboration.  
 However, increasingly sovereignty must be seen as part of a complexity of 
fragmented jurisdictions and power networks. Non-state actors 7  such as 
multinationals and global NGOs, as well as a multiplicity of regional agreements 
                                                        
1  Behring Sea Fur Seals Arbitration, 1 Moore’s Int Arb Awards (1898) 755; Norweigian Fisheries 
Case, ICJ Reports (1951) 116; Icelandic Fisheries Case, ICJ Reports (1974) 3, 175. 
2 Resolution 1803 XVII (1962); Schrijver (2008). 
3 Schrijver (2008).  
4 E.g. Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, Art 2, UNGA Res 3281 XXIX (1974)  
5 Handl (1990); Brownlie (1979). 
6 Emerton (2000). See chapters 29 and 35 in this volume. 
7 See chapter 28 in this volume. 
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create a complex network of relationships, further affected by the interplay between 
different areas of global activity in particular the exercise of economic power. These 
create a contested and complex network through which ‘sovereignty’, conservation 
and sustainable use are promoted and resisted. However, the presence of ‘sovereignty’ 
as a central feature of the CBD recognises the symbolic importance of the concept, as 
the starting point for action. 
2.2 Sovereignty as framework: facilitating complexity  
Perez8 has stressed the importance of complexity and diversity in biodiversity action – 
and the limitations on being able to make any generalised statements. The relationship 
between localities, institutions, and regulatory discourses makes the articulation of the 
role of sovereignty in biodiversity protection a highly contingent issue. Indeed, Perez 
goes as far as to argue that the relationships can only be studied using a contextual 
strategy and cautions against generalised statements. This same complexity and 
diversity has led some to argue that in some sectors regional and other agreements 
may be more important that the Convention in framing obligations and actions.9 The 
sovereignty approach in the CBD may have emerged for other reasons, but it can be 
seen as a positive approach to empowering a contextualised response.  
 Whilst sovereignty has its limitations, it has the benefit of facilitating diverse 
responses to complexity. The CBD affirms, ‘States have, in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations and the principle of international law, the sovereign 
right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies,’10 
but circumscribes that by the assertion they are also ‘responsible for conserving their 
biological diversity and for using their biological resources in a sustainable manner’.11  
This places responsibility firmly in the hands of individual states for that part of the 
global totality that lies within the territorial boundary. The extent to which the CBD 
limits sovereignty depends upon the articulation of this responsibility. 
 The three key aims set out in Article 1 are conservation, sustainable use, and fair 
and equitable sharing of the benefits arising from using genetic resources. Both by 
                                                        
8 Perez (2004). 
9 Boardman (2010). 
10 Convention on Biological Diversity (adopted, 5 June 1992, entered into force 29 December 1993) 
1760 UNTS 79 (CBD) art 3. 
11 Ibid. 
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reason of its complex gestation and its conceptualization as a framework convention, 
the obligations that follow are phrased with a high level of generality and are 
qualified by phrases such as ‘as appropriate’ or ‘so far as possible,’ which reinforce 
the context-specific nature of the expectations.  
 There are substantial differences between jurisdictions in their construction of 
ownership of biological resources, conceptualisation of ‘ownership’ and the role of 
the state in its regulation, let alone the fundamental differences in the ecosphere, and 
economic, cultural and geopolitical contexts. The one commonality is that the right to 
control the allocation and exploitation of property rights in natural resources within a 
state is consistently accorded to the sovereign state.12 Control over the exercise of 
property rights is crucial to the CBD’s reach and effectiveness, but the CBD does not 
prescribe exactly how a state should exercise that control, in relation to biodiversity, 
traditional knowledge or genetic materials. The wording of the CBD itself makes 
clear the importance of contextualised solutions. With its general and often qualified 
obligations, the CBD leaves considerable space for states to construct wholly different 
approaches.     
 There are some limitations upon sovereignty, particular in Articles 8-10 relating to 
conservation and sustainable use.13 Aside from the responsibility to cooperate, and the 
duties upon some nations to contribute financially, the strongest obligations in the 
CBD are contained in Articles 6-8. Parties are required to develop national strategies 
for conservation and sustainable use, and identify and monitor components of 
biodiversity specified in the Convention and identify activities likely to have 
significant adverse impacts. 
 The CBD requires 14  states to integrate conservation and sustainable use into 
national decision-making, and to adopt measures to avoid or minimize adverse 
impacts on biodiversity, protect and encourage customary use and support local 
populations, to develop and implement remedial action and encourage cooperation 
between public and private sectors. 
                                                        
12 E.g. 1992 Rio Declaration of the UN Conference on Environment and Development, Principle 2.  
13 See chapters 7-9 in this volume. 
14  CBD art 8 and 10. 
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 Parties commit to using their sovereignty for in situ conservation, to define and 
protect areas, manage biological resource, promote ecosystem protection and help 
finance in situ conservation in poorer states. States are required to complement these 
in situ measures for holistic ecosystem conservation with measures to preserve 
specific biodiversity components (preferably in situ) and adopt measures for recovery 
and rehabilitation. 15  These provisions articulate processes, but do not prescribe 
rigorous inputs or outcomes. The presence of processes and strategies - not their 
content or substantive outcome - suffices to deliver compliance. This contrasts, for 
instance, to the approach in relation to the Antarctic, where the applicable treaty 
explicitly limits state exercise of sovereignty with states agreeing to manage the 
exercise of their sovereignty in a particular manner, effectively placing significant 
limitations upon sovereign territorial action.16  
 CBD Articles 11-14 create further obligations for parties, but these are highly 
qualified. Without extensive monitoring and a mechanism for ensuring consistency in 
interpretation of these terms, they leave states considerable scope for local 
determination of what is 'appropriate' or 'reasonable'. At best, state party reports to the 
Conference of the Parties (COP) and to technical groups, enable a sharing of state 
approaches and some shared understanding of the meaning of these qualifier terms. 
However, given the lack of any dispute mechanism to adjudicate upon whether 
particular approaches are reasonable or appropriate, states are not effectively obliged 
to do anything specific. As such CBD provisions may facilitate those states wanting 
to take action, but allow others to take the minimum action appropriate and 
reasonable (with no mechanism for defining this lower limit). As such the provisions 
facilitate the willing, whilst not sanctioning the less willing. 
 The risk is that contextualisation conjoined with an open-textured Convention, can 
produce little practical change on the ground. The extent to which the sovereign state 
model can provide an opportunity to protect biological resources depends upon the 
values attributed to those resources by the state concerned, the effectiveness of the 
state in asserting the practical consequences of those value statements and the scope 
for states to assert distinctive values in light of international economic pressures.  
                                                        
15 CBD art 9. 
16 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (adopted 20 May1980, 
entered into force 7 April 1982) 1329 UNTS 47. Contested Antarctic sovereignty claims are frozen 
under the Antarctic Treaty (adopted 1 December 1959, entered into force 23 June 1961) 402 UNTS 71.  
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 The extent to which a state promotes values which align to the CBD objectives in 
its decisions is at least in part a product of the economic wellbeing of the country.17 It 
affects the scope of the state to regulate the incidents of ownership, in the context of 
conflicting pressure from multinationals and the needs of poor and indigenous 
communities. The CBD offers no solutions when conserving biodiversity would mean 
keeping a group of people at existing levels of poverty, and in particular does not 
address the application of ‘sustainable use’ in such contexts.18  
 The differentiated economic ability of states to play their role is recognised in the 
CBD, with Article 20 requiring developed parties to provide additional finance to 
enable developing state parties to meet their obligations.19 The effectiveness of this 
depends upon whether such funding exceeds the value to a state of exploiting a 
particular resource unsustainably. The COP recognises the centrality of economic 
policies which ascribe economic value to biodiversity and develop investment 
strategies,20  to create a space for financial support to positive biodiversity activity. 
2.3 Sustainable utilisation 
 A core feature of the CBD is the notion of ‘sustainable use’.  The CBD requires 
parties to ‘integrate consideration of the conservation and sustainable use of 
biological resources into national decision-making’. 21   This has been finessed as 
requiring ‘more efficient, ethical and humane use’ of biodiversity components. 22 
Alongside economic and financial approaches, this enables the CBD to engage with 
key extractive industries.  
  ‘Sustainable use’ relates to the notion of sustainable development.23 In the CBD, it 
is defined as ‘the use of components of biological diversity in a way and at a rate that 
does not lead to the long-term decline of biological diversity, thereby maintaining its 
potential to meet the needs and aspirations of present and future generations,’24 and 
                                                        
17 Grossman and Krueger (1993). 
18  E.g. Chappell, Wittman, Bacon and others (2013).  
19 See CBD art 21 mechanism. For a review of the implementation of arts 20 and 21: 
UNEP/CBD/COP/9/INF/5 (2013). 
20 CBD art 11. 
21 CBD art10. 
22 2004 Addis Ababa Principles and Guidelines for the Sustainable Use of Biodiversity, adopted by 
CBD Decision VII/12. 
23 WCED (1987). See chapter 4 in this volume. 
24 CBD art 2. 
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has led to several COP decisions.25 ‘Sustainable use’ has been used in a number of 
agreements apart from the CBD, with varying formulations.26 It is defined in the 
World Conservation Strategy as ‘management of human use of the biosphere so that it 
may yield the greatest sustainable beneﬁt to present generations while maintaining its 
potential to meet the needs and aspirations of future generations,’27 and similarly 
defined in the Ramsar Convention.28   
 Whilst conservation and sustainable use are compatible in principle, their 
relationship is not fully articulated in the CBD.29 It is easy to elide ‘sustainable use’ 
and ‘conservation’, but the terms cannot be equated as ‘sustainable use’ is predicated 
upon some exploitation and most importantly has a different focus – anthropocentric 
concerns about human use as opposed to biocentric thinking.  
 The presence of ‘sustainable use’ in the body of the Convention elevates it to an 
international legal obligation, but that articulation has not led to precise legal 
formulation in domestic measures, possibly because the CBD sets few parameters for 
this. Jurisdictions have avoided defining ‘sustainable use’, although many have 
adopted controls over particular biological resources that are of significance in the 
particular jurisdiction without reliance on the phrase.  
 Strategically, the inclusion of ‘sustainable use’ extends the scope of the Convention 
to economic activities including forestry, 30  agriculture, 31  fisheries, 32  and 
biotechnology.33 So the strength of sustainable use is that it brings the management of 
key industries within the purview of the CBD’s state reporting mechanisms34 as a 
space in which to share and promote more sustainable trade practices,35 and to use the 
financial mechanisms under the CBD to support those practices. The extent to which 
sustainable use potentially limits the power to bring biodiversity products to market, 
                                                        
25  E.g. CBD Decisions V/24, VI/13, and VII/12.  
26 E.g. the troubled ‘sustainable yield’ definition re fish stocks; UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(adopted 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994) 1833 UNTS 3 (UNCLOS).  
27 World Conservation Strategy, (IUCN, 1980) Section 1.4. 
28 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat (adopted 2 
February 1971, entered into force 21 December 1975) 996 UNTS 245 (Ramsar Convention) art 2. See 
chapters 8 and 13 in this volume. 
29 Bennett (2004) explores the models used for reconciling these.  
30 e.g. CBD Decision VII/11. See chapter 14 in this volume. 
31 e.g. CBD Decision III/11. See chapter 18 in this volume. 
32 e.g. CBD Decision XI/8. See chapter 9 in this volume. 
33 e.g. CBD Decision IV/3; McGraw (2002). See chapters 16 and 32 in this volume. 
34 See chapter 33 in this volume. 
35 See chapter 23 in this volume. 
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challenging the mercantilist36 priorities within the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
remains to be clarified, though. 
 Special provision is made in relation to the sustainable use of genetic resources.37 
Whereas elsewhere compromises with mercantilism happen outside of the CBD, in 
this case the CBD is explicitly influenced by mercantilist principles:  
 
Each Contracting Party shall endeavor to create conditions to facilitate access to genetic 
resources for environmentally sound uses by other Contracting Parties and not to impose 
restrictions that run counter to the objectives of this Convention.
38  
It preserves the position of the state to the extent that movement must be subject to 
the prior informed consent of the state of origin,39 requires the benefits of exploitation 
to be shared40  and enables state regulation of use to achieve CBD aims. This positive 
approach extends to duties to share access to and transfer of technology.41  
2.4 Limits to sovereignty 
A key limitation upon sovereignty is its territoriality. Three distinct issues give rise to 
desires by states to seek to influence biodiversity action beyond territorial boundaries:  
• The mismatch between jurisdictional boundaries and key biodiversity areas;  
• A desire to enhance protection of biodiversity in other states; 
• A desire to act or influence conduct in areas that are not the territory of any 
individual state.   
 Each creates different pressures for the CBD approach, but they all result from 
states desiring to protect biodiversity beyond the level being generally afforded by 
other states. So it is primarily a tension faced by those states or organisations who are 
strong advocates of biodiversity protection. 
                                                        
36 Mercantilism in this context refers to the extent to which WTO jurisprudence focuses upon 
protection of the seller’s ability to sell products globally (as opposed to other aspects of economic 
activity). 
37 See chapter 17 in this volume. 
38 CBD art 15(2). 
39 CBD art 15(5). 
40 CBD art 15(7). 
41 CBD art 16. See chapter 26 in this volume. 
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 Whilst it is not possible to assert sovereignty over species beyond territorial 
limits,42 the CBD extends the obligations upon State parties to actions outside of their 
physical territory and carried out under its jurisdiction or control e.g. state registered 
vessels on the high seas.43  In line with general principles of international law, 44 the 
CBD makes clear that States have ‘the responsibility to ensure that [these] activities ... 
do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits 
of national jurisdiction’. 45  These limitations prohibit state-derived extraterritorial 
harmful action, but at the same time mean that positive action beyond territorial limits 
requires techniques of cooperation and persuasion, with or without economic 
incentives. 
 Of the three pressures for positive extraterritorial action, the first stems from the 
mismatch between territorial boundaries and ecosystems. This multiple sovereignties 
problem 46  is common in international law, 47  but particularly acute in relation to 
ecosystems.48 The UN General Assembly has adopted a number of resolutions that 
encourage cooperation and multilateral approaches. 49  Principle 7 of the Rio 
Declaration requires states to cooperate to ‘conserve protect and restore’ ecosystems’. 
CBD Article 5 similarly requires cooperation in respect of areas beyond national 
jurisdiction, and on ‘other matters of mutual interest’. These forms of cooperation can 
only be as strong as the weakest jurisdiction within the collaboration area and are 
vulnerable to non-participation by some states. The CBD does not offer any particular 
incentive for effective cooperation, other than financial ones. Indeed the Tuna-
Dolphin dispute postscript suggests that WTO disputes may be a more effective 
vehicle in securing inter-state cooperation.50 The role of trade regulation in delivering 
                                                        
42 Behring Sea Fur Seals Arbitration, 1 Moore’s Int Arb Awards (1898) 755 
43 CBD art 4. 
44 Trail Smelter arbitration (1941) 35 AJIL 716; Corfu Channel case (1949) ICJ Rep 4, 22. 
45 CBD art 3. 
46 McPherson and Boyer (2015).   
47 Ramsar Convention art 5; Convention on Migratory Species (adopted 23 June 1979, entered into 
force 1 November 1983) 1651 UNTS 333 arts 2(1), 4 and 5; Convention on the conservation of 
European wildlife and natural habitats (adopted 19 September 1979, entered into force 1 June 1982) 
1284 UNTS 209 (Bern Convention) arts 1(1) 4(4), 10(1) and 11(1). 
48 See chapter 5 in this volume. 
49 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (12 December 1974) A/RES/29/3281 Art 3; UNEP 
(1979). 
50 GATT Dispute Settlement Panel Report on US Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (Tuna I) 30 ILM 
1594-1623 (1991); GATT Dispute Settlement Panel Report on US Restrictions on Imports of Tuna 
(Tuna II) 33 ILM 839-903 (1994); Agreement on the International Dolphin Conservation Program 
(adopted 15 May 1998, entered into force 15 February 1999) 37 ILM 1246 (1998) (International 
Dolphin Conservation Program). 
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improved levels of protection for biodiversity in states owning critical biodiversity 
resources is well documented, indeed the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species (CITES)51 is fundamentally grounded in a trade response to the 
perceived limitations of sovereignty-based protection of biodiversity.52 
 One state cannot directly mandate action in another state, save insofar as it has 
global jurisdiction over its citizens.53 However, sovereign units with sufficient relative 
market authority can implement trade incentives. Their legitimacy is of necessity 
framed within WTO discourses, and ultimately validity is determined by the WTO 
Dispute Settlement. The growing range of techniques being deployed to legitimise 
such measures within the WTO jurisprudence illustrates the tension felt by at least 
some states in relation to the progress in biodiversity protection within a sovereignty 
paradigm of biodiversity governance.54  
 The third distinct area of extraterritorial concern is in relation to those parts of the 
planet which are not within the jurisdiction of any one state: res communis. These 
cannot become part of the jurisdiction of any state,55 or be subject to the control of 
any one state in terms of asserting rights to exploit or protect. 56  That does not 
preclude private ownership of specific ecological materials through capture or 
harvesting. Protection of biodiversity in those areas depends upon extraterritorial 
jurisdiction over state citizens, or express international agreement. 
 The CBD does not address this question. Its approach is to require states to 
cooperate with others concerning areas beyond national jurisdiction, but the provision 
is vague. 57  In practice, ad hoc pragmatism has dominated the development of 
biodiversity protection in non-sovereign space, for example the UN Convention on 
                                                        
51 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (adopted 3 
March 1973, entered into force 1 July 1975) 993 UNTS 243 (CITES). See chapter 7 in this volume. 
52 See chapter 23 in this volume. 
53 E.g. Boudreaux (2007).   
54  E,g, WTO, US- Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products  I WT/DS58/AB/R 
(1998); and II WT/DS58/AB/RW (2001)  cp WTO, Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of 
Biotech Products WT/DS291/R, 292/R and 293/R (2006). Perez (2004) offers an extensive analysis of 
the trade – ecosphere relationship. 
55 Geneva Convention on the High Seas (adopted 29 April 1958, entered into force 30 September 1962) 
450 UNTS 11; UNCLOS.  
56 Behring Sea Fur Seals Arbitration, 1 Moore’s Int Arb Awards (1898) 755; Norweigian Fisheries 
Case, ICJ Reports (1951) 116; Icelandic Fisheries Case, ICJ Reports (1974) 3, 175. 
57 CBD Article 5. 
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the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)58 in relation to waters beyond the territorial limit gives 
states exclusive sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and manage 
biodiversity for a further two hundred miles. The concept is one of exclusive rights 
but with duties in relation to conservation and sustainable utilisation.59 Critics of the 
approach doubt the extent to which the sustainable use obligations are more than 
illusionary, 60 but the scheme at least puts this space on the same footing in relation to 
sustainable use obligations as territorial space. Beyond two hundred miles, UNCLOS 
adopts a quasi-sustainable use provision,61 requiring that all high seas freedoms are 
exercised with due regard for the interests of other states in also using addressing 
intra- if not inter-generational equity. All states are made subject to a duty to conserve 
and manage the living resources of the seas. Whilst differently phrased, this parallels 
the CBD, although protective duties here are a corollary of use not an adjunct of 
sovereignty.62 
 An alternative approach is to centre the international agreement upon a species or 
ecosystem rather than a physical location. Where species spend time in places that are 
not sovereign territory, or the state’s sovereign interest may well not deliver 
sustainable utilisation, such as the Arctic species, there are species-specific treaties, 
for example in relation to North Pacific seals63 and polar bears.64 In many cases the 
rationale underpinning these multilateral measures is a growing recognition that 
action on biodiversity is constrained by the failures of territorial conceptualisations 
inherent in sovereignty.  
 One approach is through a reformulation of the concept of sovereignty as including 
a duty to cooperate for the good of the international community. 65 The CBD does 
include a duty of cooperation: this is articulated as a reformulation of sovereignty 
rather than an exercise of sovereignty. The language of ‘responsibility’ to cooperate 
                                                        
58 UNCLOS (adopted 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994) 1833 UNTS 3. 
59 UNCLOS art 61; International Court of Justice, Libya/Malta Continental Shelf case [1985] ICJ 
Rep.13R.  
60 Barnes (2006). 
61 UNCLOS Article 87. 
62 See chapter 9 in this volume. 
63 Agreement Between The Government Of The United States of America And The Government Of 
Her Britannic Majesty For A Modus Vivendi In Relation To Fur Seal Fisheries In Bering Sea (adopted 
15 June 1891) 175 CTS 223; North Pacific Fur Seal Convention (adopted 7 July 1911) 214 CTS 80. 
64 Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears (adopted 15 November 1973, entered into force 26 
May 1976) 13 ILM 13 (1974). 
65 Handl (1990). 
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not redefine sovereignty;66 indeed there is an inherent problem in that the duty to 
cooperate itself assumes the state as an autonomous entity.  
 And whilst some progress can be made by states voluntarily agreeing to regulate 
the conduct of their nationals in these non-sovereign areas in relation to biodiversity, 
this carries no sanctions against citizens of other states. So various attempts have been 
made to try to conceptualise a shared duty not constrained by sovereignty. A number 
of different approaches have been offered as a transnational rationale for biodiversity 
action, variously using the language of common concern, heritage, inheritance or 
trust.67   
 The language of trust, whilst having domestic potential has not been successful 
internationally. 68  In contrast, the concept of ‘common heritage’ 69  has been used 
successfully in international law albeit to date limited to the non-living resources of 
deep-sea bed70 and outer space.71 It starts from the notion that resources are owned by 
the planet as a whole. It sees this as a prior limitation upon the capacity for states to 
assert sovereignty over these common resources. It focuses upon requiring the 
exploitation to be for the benefit of all.  
 The dominant discourse is of positive affirmation of utility of the ‘common concern’ 
language, arguing that the planetary environment is no longer perceived as being a 
matter of individual state sovereignty, but is a common concern. 72  This is the 
language most commonly seen in biodiversity instruments as a means of structuring 
the exercise of sovereignty, and offers an alternative to the more contentious 
‘common heritage’ language. Baslar, writing in 1998, documented the early evolution 
of this concept73 as designed to foster and justify international cooperation and shared 
responsibility.  
                                                        
66 CBD Article 5. 
67 Sarkar (2012); Gillespie (2014).  
68 See Behring Sea Fur Seals Arbitration, 1 Moore’s Int Arb Awards (1898) 755 where the USA 
argued for quasi-trust obligations because of the seals’ regular return to US territory for breeding.  
69 Baslar (1998). 
70 UNCLOS preamble and art 136. 
71 Agreement Concerning the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (adopted 5 
December 1976, entered into force 11 July 1984) 1363 UNTS 3. 
72 Cottier and Matteotii-Berkutova (2009). 
73 Baslar (1998).  
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 The CBD preamble reference to biodiversity conservation as ‘a common concern of 
mankind,’74 provides a rationale for action and has an interpretative function. This 
does not assert control over non-sovereign areas or limit sovereignty, but provides 
legitimacy for affirming that sovereignty should be exercised in a particular manner.  
However, the precise difference that the phrase makes, in terms of obligations or 
enforcement is not entirely articulated. The concept has thus generated debate about 
its substantive significance. 75  It has been described 76  as making biodiversity 
conservation a legitimate concern for the international community, and also imposing 
a common responsibility. A regime that asserted common heritage as its rationale 
would transfer jurisdiction over biodiversity asset stewardship from states to an 
international authority.77  The concept of ‘common concern’ does not require that 
jurisdictional transfer, but does legitimate international engagement and may point 
towards the need to create new global structures. In doing so, it opens up a debate 
about the scope of the rights and obligations for states to address concerns beyond 
their own territorial jurisdiction and for some raises the fear of the globally powerful 
using it to justify interventions extraterritorially.78 
 Whilst the articulation of ‘common concern’, may in the future move from its 
current position as a shared understanding to a principle from which new structures of 
legal regulation could flow, its current use is to justify expressions of concern as 
opposed to direct legal  intervention in state sovereignty. 
2.5  Scrutinising the exercise of sovereignty 
The effectiveness of conventions depends on the ‘effectiveness of the machinery for 
implementation and enforcement and the level of participation by states”.79  Whilst 
there is evidence of state action being constrained by trade laws,80 and evidence of 
state action to seek to circumvent CITES,81 there is little evidence of state action 
being constrained by the CBD. Indeed there is evidence that sovereignty over 
                                                        
74 Early drafts of the CBD used ‘common heritage’.  
75 Biermann (2014). 
76 UNEP (1990). 
77 As is seen with UNCLOS part XI in relation to the deep sea bed.  
78 Cottier (2012). 
79 Bowman (2000). 
80 Tuna I; Tuna II; International Dolphin Conservation Program. 
81 Whether through tolerance or evasion. Reeve (2002). 
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biodiversity encourages or facilitates overexploitation. 82  No direct compliance 
mechanism is specified in the CBD, compliance depending upon reporting83  and 
implementation reviews. States report upon their own action. States themselves may 
lack data, may focus on limited parts of a remit or simply misreport.84 It is difficult to 
adduce evidence to challenge a state’s self assessment. Responses to this compliance 
gap have been suggestions of compliance review, via a body agreed by the 
Convention parties, or a global monitoring network that would rely upon a subset of 
indicator species, to avoid both the lack of data and the paralysis of too much data that 
affects the current debate.85 But at present compliance depends upon self-reporting. 
Complaint procedures offer another potential vehicle for scrutiny– enabling states that 
consider others not to be taking sufficient action to raise concerns. Compliance is 
essentially through the soft mechanisms of critical comment upon reporting.86   
 The CBD depends on the implementation and enforcement of domestic legislation, 
but comparative review of legislation, let alone implementation, is a complex and 
highly contextualised matter and not one upon which the CBD embarks. The COP 
regularly sets priorities, and receives reports, but there continue to be wide differences 
between and within 87  jurisdictions in even the principles being applied to assess 
ecosystem and economic priorities. This difference in policy, but also in geography 
and ecosystems makes monitoring difficult.88  
 A key aspect of the rationale for the CBD, as indicated in its preamble, was the 
‘urgent need to develop scientific, technical and institutional capacities’. The core 
scientific advice to the CBD comes from its Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical 
and Technological Advice (SBSTTA).89 Lack of evidence is thus not the problem – in 
addition to SBSTTA, IUCN and others produce much data of relevance to the CBD, 
but there is a need for a structural vehicle for engagement of scientific expertise, to 
deliver scientifically informed prioritisation and in particular a scientific basis for 
critique of state activity. SBSTTA reports regularly that biodiversity science is 
                                                        
82 Schrijver (2008). 
83 CBD Article 26. 
84 Chayes and Handler (1995). 
85 Pereira and Cooper (2006). 
86 See chapter 33 in this volume. 
87 E.g. Boardman (2009).  
88 Cape and others (2005). 
89 Established under CBD Article 25. 
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essentially localist and its reporting highly dependent upon state specific outcomes. 
The limitations of the SBSTTA were recognised by the CBD COP in 2012.90 In this 
connection, it can be noted that the Intergovernmental Platform on Biodiversity and 
Ecosystem Services (IPBES) was established to develop, inter alia, the next global 
assessment of biodiversity and ecosystems services in 2018.91 
2.6 Conclusion 
As long as biodiversity is seen as a question of sovereign state resource management, 
the CBD is dependent upon the persuasion of inter-governmental pressures. This is 
not a council of despair; it is simply to recognize the complexity of mapping the 
impact of the Convention upon sovereignty, and the exercise of sovereign powers in a 
diverse ecosystem context. Case studies of species, states or individual ecosystems 
provide insights, but there is only a limited ability to move from those to more general 
statements about the exercise of sovereignty.  
 This is essentially a soft system, which means states are largely able to move at 
their own pace. For states wishing to take strong action, it offers a degree of protected 
space to legitimise state action, but does not offer direct tools to ensure action by 
those whose economic or political context does not prioritise biodiversity action. 
Instead, the CBD’s emphasis upon financial co-operation seeks to create an economic 
climate in which biodiversity action is prioritised by all. However, COP progress does 
not suggest the CBD is a vehicle for setting - let alone pushing - the pace of change. 
Without a redefinition of sovereignty, an articulation of a trans-sovereign justification 
or stronger enforcement mechanisms, the current approach will only produce limited 
progress.   
 Recognising the significance of context, three areas for future research stand out. 
Firstly, some progress could be made through a meta-study of existing case studies of 
species, states and individual ecosystems. Beyond that there is a need for comparative 
research into the impact of the CBD on state exercise of sovereignty in terms of both 
constraining sovereignty and preserving sovereign space for states to protect 
biodiversity (and in particular legislative responses). Secondly, a biodiversity 
focussed exploration of the exercise extra-territorial sovereignty by states. Finally, the 
                                                        
90 CBD Decisions XI/13, VIII/10 and X/12. 
91 CBD Decisions XI/2 and XI/3.  
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relationship between conservation and sustainable use and the scope for using 
sustainable use to influence trade decisions would benefit from further study.  
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